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JUDGES AS AGENTS OF THE LAW
Daniel Harris
A spate of recent scholarship uses fiduciary metaphors to model the
roles of various public officials. One such article in the California
Law Review posits that judges are fiduciaries of the people and
therefore have the power (akin to that of corporate directors) to do
whatever is in the best interests of the people, even if that means
disregarding precedents or statutes. By contrast, a more traditional
model sees judges as agents or servants of the law and therefore
bound to follow the law rather than use it to advance their preferred
policies.
This essay examines both approaches with particular emphasis on
their use in ordinary business litigation. The essay concludes that
telling judges to act as fiduciaries of the people encourages courtled social change. Telling judges they are agents of the law is more
consistent with the judicial oath, the rule of law, and the role of
courts in the American democratic system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What should judges do in ordinary business litigation when the
requirements of the law and the demands of justice seem to conflict?
This question comes up all the time. The plaintiff has a sympathetic
claim with a technical defect or gap in proof. The defendant’s
conduct seems lawful but unfair or technically illegal but entirely
reasonable. Conventional legal reasoning leads to one conclusion;
gut instinct or sophisticated policy analysis leads to another. Which
takes priority?
In practice, of course, judges will strive for a decision that is
consistent with both law and justice, adjusting their definitions of
law and justice as needed to create an overlap. Failing that, judges
will lean one way or another depending on a host of factors. But, in
theory, what should judges do when law and substantive justice
seem at odds? How should judges be encouraged to resolve the
conflict?
Opinion is divided on this issue. There are two leading schools
of thought. Each has its preferred metaphor for the judicial role. One
philosophy, which sees judges as fiduciaries or guardians of the
people, believes that judges should prefer substantive justice over
law. The opposing philosophy sees judges as agents or servants of
the law who must do what the law requires.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE MODEL
A. The Moral Imperative of Altruism
The idea that judges should be impartial and decide cases in
accordance with law has its critics. For many, it is preferable that
judges do whatever they can to foster a more just, equitable and
equal society.
A 2017 article by Robin West calls one variant of this attitude
“relational justice” and says it is based on a moral commitment to
substantive equality and individual self-determination.1 To satisfy
that commitment in the realm of contracts, for example, the law must
go beyond “formal equality and a formal commitment to liberty” to
ensure actual justice whenever parties “formally agreed” to
contracts that are nevertheless “operating unconscionably upon
them, or … lack the maturity to best determine sensible contract
terms.”2
A classic article in the Harvard Law Review by Duncan
Kennedy dubs this philosophy “altruism” and contrasts it to the
1. See Robin West, The New Legal Criticism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE
144,151(2017),https://columbialawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/West
-final-read-PDF.pdf.
2. Id. at 152-53.
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opposing theory of individualism.3 The altruist philosophy is based
on what the 1976 article calls the “universal ideal of human
brotherhood.”4 The “essence of altruism is the belief that one ought
not to indulge a sharp preference for one’s own interest over those
of others. Altruism enjoins us to make sacrifices, to share, and to be
merciful.”5 Altruism rejects the individualist idea of freedom. As
the article explains: “The ‘freedom’ of individualism is negative,
alienated and arbitrary. . . . We can achieve real freedom only
collectively, through group self-determination.”6
According to the Kennedy article, a key tenet of the altruist
philosophy is that “there is simply no way for the judge to be
neutral.”7 The common law rules of freedom of contract and private
property reflect a deliberate choice to protect “the actions of the
aggressive and competent even when those actions are directly at
the expense of the weak.”8 Far from being apolitical or natural, these
rules are an expression of “concrete individualist economic interests
dressed up in gibberish.”9 Therefore, “[t]hose who enforce that legal
order must accept responsibility for the allocation of resources and
distribution of income it produces. . . . All outcomes are equally
‘natural.’ The question is which one is best.”10 Judges cannot avoid
personal responsibility for the unjust consequences of their
decisions by saying they are just doing their jobs. According to the
altruists, “[t]he dichotomy of the private and the official is
untenable, and the judge must undertake to practice justice”11 even
if that means ignoring settled law.
This approach finds support in the pragmatic idea that law is “a
means to an end, [a] purposeful human activity aimed at achieving
social goals.”12 For many, this means that legal doctrines should be
evaluated based on whether they advance a “progressive and
enlightened” vision of social justice.13 If existing rules do not lead
to proper results, those rules should be disregarded or changed.

3. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976).
4. Id. at 1772.
5. Id. at 1717.
6. Id. at 1774.
7. Id. at 1766.
8. Id. at 1745.
9. Id. at 1749.
10. Id. at 1748.
11. Id. at 1773.
12. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L. J. 943, 956 (1987).
13. See e.g. Curtis Nyquist, Re-Reading Legal Realism and Tracing a
Genealogy of Balancing, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 771, 784 (2017).
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An example of this approach in constitutional adjudication is a
1986 article14 by Erwin Chemerinsky, now Dean of the University
of California Law School. The article notes “that formalism is
impossible in deciding cases and the inevitable discretion ensures
that values enter into the interpretive process.”15 Given the necessity
of choice, the article argues, the Supreme Court should choose
progressive values over “the Framers’ values—values that were
racist and sexist.”16
Those who adhere to this philosophy reject theories of justice
that direct judges to follow rules. As Anthony Sebok notes, the terms
“formalism” and “positivism” are “’frequently used as an epithet”
in modern academic circles.17 Indeed, some scholars go further and
take on the shibboleth of the rule of law.
A 1977 article in the Yale Law Journal by Morton Horwitz, for
example, points out that while the rule of law “undoubtedly restrains
power, . . . it also prevents power’s benevolent exercise.” 18 The
article goes on to criticize the rule of law because it “promotes
substantive inequality by creating a consciousness that radically
separates law from politics, means from ends, processes from
outcomes.”19 The article also finds fault with the rule of law because
“it enables the shrewd, the calculating, and the wealthy to
manipulate its forms to their own advantage. And it ratifies and
legitimates an adversarial, competitive, and atomistic conception of
human relations.”20
To similar effect is a 2003 article by David Kairys, which argues
that “[t]he broad, grandiose vision of the rule of law . . . lends a false
legitimacy to existing social and power relations.”21 Judges always
have the option (and, indeed, the moral duty) to read progressive
values into the law. Consequently, there is no legitimate excuse for
judges who reach unjust results. As the article puts it: “the common
theme of legal opinions – the law made me do it – is wrong and
misleading.”22
Another trope of this school of thought is that democracy is
corrupt. Legislatures do not serve the public interest because
14. Erwin Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis
of Professor Carter’s Approach to Judicial Review, 66 B.U. L. REV. 47 (1986).
15. Id. at 60.
16. Id. at 59.
17. Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138,
1144 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1998)).
18. Morton Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86
YALE L. J. 561, 566 (1977).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. David Kairys, Searching for the Rule of Law, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
307, 320 (2003).
22. Id. at 322.
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legislation is “a sale by legislators to interest groups.”23 As a 1991
article by Einer Elhauge explains: “Modern interest group theory . .
. offers a compelling explanation for something we all know is true:
our democratic system regularly produces some results that appear
contrary to the interests of the general public.”24
Judges, on the other hand, are viewed positively. For example, a
1989 article by William Eskridge suggests that courts are better able
to “articulate public values” because their “independence reduces
the inertia and interest group pressures of everyday politics, and
because their open, reasoned, and incremental [decision-making]
assures a more rational discussion of public issues.”25
Under the principle that law should be construed to advance the
public good, it follows for these scholars that appellate judges
should, must and therefore do have the power to “make decisions
for society” based on what they determine “to be the public’s
intermediate-and long-term best interests” even if their “choices . . .
are not entirely in accordance with legislative will, current public
sentiment, or the existing body of case law and settled principles.”26
Great judges, it is said, are the ones who use this power most
freely.27 All judges should be encouraged to follow their example.
As a 2007 article by Neil Siegel explains: “there is much to be said
. . . for judicial boldness and even heroism in appropriate cases.
Some of the most celebrated Supreme Court opinions in American
history were hardly models of judicial restraint.”28
B. Judges as Guardians or Fiduciaries of the People
A 2013 article in the California Law Review entitled A
Fiduciary Theory of Judging29 by Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet and
Michael Serota brings these ideas together and combines them with
the burgeoning field of fiduciary theory to provide a conceptual
justification for an expansive view of the judicial role. The article
23. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285 n.35
(1988).
24. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L. J. 31, 32 (1991).
25. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1016 (1989).
26. Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 1307, 1330 (1995).
27. See Edmund Ursin, How Great Judges Think: Judges Richard Posner,
Henry Friendly, and Roger Traynor on Judicial Lawmaking, 57 BUFF. L. REV.
1267 (2009).
28. Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24
CONST. COMMENTARY 701, 705 (2007).
29. Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of
Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013).
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starts and concludes that judges are, in fact, fiduciaries of the people,
stating: “To say that judges hold the public’s interest in trust is more
than mere rhetoric or analogy; the people are the real beneficiaries
and judges should conform their conduct to fiduciary standards.”30
Fiduciaries come in many varieties. Some, like servants, are
bound to follow orders. Others, like guardians, have discretion to do
whatever they deem to be in the best interest of their charge. The
article likens judges to guardians and other fiduciaries with broad
discretion by describing judges as to “‘trustees’ of some kind:
independent but loosely constrained by precedent and the
authorization to try to develop standards over time, subject only to
impeachment or elections for accountability.” 31 At another point,
the article compares judges to corporate directors, saying “that
judges have wide discretion in performing their duties of care,
consistent with a translation of the ‘business judgment rule,’ as
applied to judicial business.”32
These broad powers, the article explains, do not require
legislative authority or an electoral mandate, but instead accrue to
judges from their status as fiduciaries. As the article notes, “neither
implied nor express consent are essential components of the
fiduciary architecture. Most obviously, guardians who act on behalf
of minors or incompetents do so on the basis of trust reposed without
consent.” 33 The article goes on to note that this “fiduciary rendering
of [judicial power] provides a useful counterpoint to the
conventional liberal account of legitimate democratic authority,
grounded in the consent of the governed.”34
Reasoning from these premises, the article concludes that judges
have both the power and the duty to do whatever is in the best
interests of the people. This includes the power to do what the
legislature should have done to protect the people. As the article puts
it, “in those instances where the legislature has failed in its fiduciary
capacity, the judge as fiduciary may look to the people, the ultimate
beneficiary, directly.” 35 “These situations require judges to
reengage in direct fiduciary protection of the public through their
decision making.”36 The fiduciary authority of judges also includes
the power to override precedent. As the article explains, recognition
of the “wide discretion” of judges should “enable judicial innovation
by encouraging risk taking by judges.”37

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 721.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 748.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 737.
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III. CRITIQUE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE MODEL
The fiduciary theory proposed by Leib, Ponet and Serota would
repurpose the judiciary into a spearhead for moral progress and
social change. For those who agree with the authors’ agenda, their
article provides a valuable blueprint. For those who disagree, the
article illustrates the flaws of a tempting but mistaken approach to
judging.
A. Which People?
Taken literally, the mandate that judges act as fiduciaries of the
people puts judges in a hopeless conflict position. There is, in fact,
no monolithic “people.” Society is composed of “a bunch of
individuals” (associated with each other in many different groups).38
These individuals have differing interests, so that “on most issues
the people’s interests will diverge and will often be in direct
conflict.”39
Therefore, telling judges they should decide cases based on the
best interest of the people gives no meaningful guidance. A 1930
article by the legal realist Karl Llewellyn makes this point well by
asking: “Where is the unity, the single coherent group? Where is the
demonstrable objective which is social, and not opposed by groups
well nigh as important as those which support it?”40
To make sense of a charge to act as popular fiduciaries, judges
would need to select particular groups of people to treat as
surrogates for the people as a whole and give lesser weight to the
interests of other groups. Two recent articles in the California Law
Review anticipate this need by offering formulae that judges could
use in selecting favored and disfavored groups.41
But judging is supposed to be impersonal and impartial.
Decisions should not depend on whether litigants come from groups
that the judge likes, hates or fears. The federal judicial oath 42
requires judges to “swear (or affirm) that [they] will administer
justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and
38. Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1606 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004)).
39. D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671,
719 (2013).
40. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence — The Next Step, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 461 (1930).
41. See Aaron Tang, Rethinking Political Power in Judicial Review, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 1755 (2018) (formula for picking disfavored groups); Bertrall L.
Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and
the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (2016) (formula for picking favored groups).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 453.
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to the rich, and that [they will discharge their legal duties] faithfully
and impartially . . . ”43 Similarly, the “common law judicial oath . .
. binds a judge to ‘do right to all manner of people . . . without fear
or favor, affection or ill-will[.]’” 44 The same idea appears in the
Bible. Right after the prohibitions against cursing the deaf and
putting stumbling blocks before the blind, the Bible says: "You shall
do no injustice in court. You shall not be partial to the poor or defer
to the great, but in righteousness shall you judge your neighbor."45
Consider the consequences of departure from this norm. Once it
becomes clear that judges are puissant policymakers who favor the
interests of particular groups, various groups would vie (even more
than they do today) to put their champions on the bench. The
outcome of these struggles would vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. In some places, dominant law firms might prevail. In
others, big business might come out on top. In still other
jurisdictions, small business or the working class or members of
particular racial or religious groups might dominate. In other places,
the police might succeed.
The law would vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (or from
courtroom to courtroom) depending on the affiliation of the resident
judges. Some courts might strike down minimum wage laws based
on testimony from economic experts that the regulations are
contrary to the best interests of the people. Other courts might
double the minimum wage based on reports from other experts that
the rate prescribed by the legislature is too low. It is even possible
that some judges might take orders from their political leaders and
permit abuses of executive power.
The dystopian possibilities can be seen in the history of
revolutionary tribunals, vigilance committees and politicized courts.
For example (to quote Cass Sunstein), “in the Nazi period, German
judges rejected formalism. They did not rely on the ordinary or
original meaning of legal texts. On the contrary, they thought that
statutes should be construed in accordance with the spirit of the age,
defined by reference to the Nazi regime.”46
B. Popular Champions?
But suppose that the fiduciary of the people model of judging
just nudges the judiciary into a more activist role, so that judges take
bolder action and exercise wider discretion to promote what they

43. Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A
Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 25 (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 453.
44. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 445 (2015).
45. Leviticus 19:15 (English Standard Version).
46. Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism be Defended Empirically, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 636, 636 (1999).
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believe to be the public interest. Would that be a good thing? Not
necessarily.
Judges are unlikely popular champions. As James Andrew
Wynn, Jr. & Eli Paul Mazur point out: “The life experiences of
judges are overwhelmingly white, male, and affluent.”47 Moreover,
judges do not have the data or expertise needed to assess the interests
of the people or to figure out how those interests can best be served.
As a 1988 article by Judge Michael McConnell notes, “[Judges] are
carefully insulated from the real world.”48 They are not personally
accountable for the practical impact of their decisions or even
generally aware of them.49 “They are dependent for information and
ideas upon people with an inherent professional axe to grind.” 50
Furthermore, judges do not have the time to determine how they
might better advance the people’s best interests. “Their caseloads . .
. are overwhelming.”51
If judges were required to make decisions based on the public
interest, they would likely equate the unknowable public interest
with something they do know, such as their own values and the
values of their class.52 As a result, “[i]t is hardly clear that liberating
those who wield legal power from the ‘mistaken’ belief that legal
doctrine constrains their actions will have a progressive effect.”53
Consider history. As David Kairys points out, the “the courts have
more often been a barrier to [progressive] human rights than a means
for their realization.”54Alternatively, consider how today’s Supreme
Court (no doubt believing it is acting in the best interests of the
people) has been reinterpreting the First Amendment in a way that
Amy Kapczynski denounces as a “market-supremacist” attack on
“democratic governance.”55
Also, as a 2019 article by Uri Weiss points out, increased
uncertainty as to the enforceability of rights "stimulates the transfer
47. James Andrew Wynn, Jr. & Eli Paul Mazur, Judicial Diversity: Where
Independence and Accountability Meet, 67 ALB. L. REV. 775, 785–86 (2004).
48. Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional
Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 106 (1988).
49. Id. at 106 (“judges are irresponsible in the most fundamental sense: they
are not accountable for the consequences of their decisions and ordinarily are not
even aware of them.”).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 105 (“judges are more likely to impose upon us the prejudices of
their class.”).
53. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 500 (1987).
54. David Kairys, Searching for the Rule of Law, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
307, 323 (2003).
55. Amy Kapczynski, The Lochnerized First Amendment and the FDA:
Toward a More Democratic Political Economy: Response to the Columbia Law
Review’s 2018 Symposium, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 179, 195 (2018).
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of wealth from risk-averse to risk-neutral people via settlements.
Therefore, because poor people are more risk-averse than rich
people are, legal uncertainty transfers wealth from the poor to the
rich.”56
Interestingly, libertarians such as Randy Barnett endorse the
idea of judges as fiduciaries of the people but see the mission as the
protection of liberty. 57 Other scholars have doubts about this
program. A 2007 article by Thomas McAfee warns that rather than
providing “the ticket to ‘rights nirvana.’ . . . the ‘freedom’ we
thereby grant to courts is as likely to lead to injustice and the denial
of basic rights as it is to advance [worthy] goals.”58 A 2018 article
by Mark Pulliam calls it a “sophomoric reverie to imagine that
enlightened judges will always be on the right side of history.”59
After all, the article notes, “judges are just government officials
wearing robes, not High Priests whose rulings are infallible or
divinely inspired.”60
C. Democracy
Another flaw in the idea that judges should make decisions
based on the best interests of the people, rather than legislative
directives, is that it is inconsistent with constitutional democracy.
Under our system, the people are sovereign and have the right,
within limits prescribed by the Constitution, “to govern themselves
through representative self-government.”61 A corollary principle is
“that all legitimate authority, including that of judges, stems initially
from the consent of the governed.” 62 In other words, “all
government officials are mere agents, exercising only such authority
as is delegated by law.”63
Legislation is a task delegated to the elected legislatures. Judges
are supposed to decide cases based on the evidence and the law.
Obviously, this involves some discretion in figuring out what the
law means. But under democratic theory the discretion is one of a
subordinate, not a superior. Thus, for example, in interpreting
statutes, (to quote John Manning, now Dean of Harvard Law
56. Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty, 2019 J. DISP.
RESOL. 149, 182 (2019).
57. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 43.
58. Thomas B. McAfee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal
Thought: The Presumption in Favor of Liberty over Law and the Court over the
Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1499, 1588–89 (2007).
59. Mark Pulliam, Unleashing the “Least Dangerous” Branch: Quis
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, 22 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 423, 458 (2018).
60. Id. at 463.
61. Id. at 439.
62. McConnell, supra note 48, at 92.
63. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 113, 145 (1998–1999).
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School) “it is widely assumed that federal judges must act as
Congress’s faithful agents.”64 Giving judges the power to disregard
statutes whenever they believe the legislature has failed to act in the
best interests of the people, the-fiduciary-of-the-people thesis
violates “the bedrock principle of our constitutional government—
popular sovereignty.”65 The thesis invites (indeed, requires) judges
to “usurp a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected
legislature” 66 and engage in what a 1988 article by Michael
McConnell describes as “the judicial equivalent of a coup d’etat.”67
Or, as Mark Pulliam puts it in attacking a libertarian version of
judicial activism: “By giving unelected federal judges carte blanche
to second-guess all federal, state, and local laws, the theory of
judicial engagement effectively eviscerates state sovereignty and
makes the American people wards of the federal courts . . . ”68
Over the years, different sides have made the argument for
democracy. A century ago, progressives who felt frustrated by a
conservative judiciary sounded the theme. Thus, a 1921 book by
Justice Benjamin Cardozo says that judges deciding cases based on
their “individual sense of justice . . . might result in a benevolent
despotism if the judges were benevolent [but it] would put an end to
the reign of law.”69
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the pro-democracy
rhetoric became a conservative trope. For example, a dissent by
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor states: “the Constitution does not
constitute us as ‘Platonic Guardians’ . . . ”70 A dissent by Justice
Hugo Black (once a liberal hero) says that for the Supreme Court to
use theories of “‘natural justice,’ . . . or whatnot to veto federal or
state laws simply takes away from Congress and States the power to
make laws based on their own judgment of fairness and wisdom and
transfers that power to this Court . . . ”71
In this century, the conservatism of the current Supreme Court
has led many on the left to return to the pro-democracy argument for
limiting courts. As a 2008 article by Josh Benson notes, these “Anti64. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 5 (2001).
65. Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist
Interpretation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1575 (2010).
66. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1947).
67. McConnell, supra note 48, 97.
68. Pulliam, supra, note 58, at 439.
69. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 136
(1921).
70. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453
(1983) (O’Connor, J., joined by White and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
71. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 513 (1965) (Black, J.
dissenting).
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Court scholars [believe] that the American political process is robust
and open; that courts intervening against it are undemocratic; that
lawyers, judges, and academics are to be regarded as dangerous
elites; and that judicial power stifles grassroots empowerment.”72
D. The Rule of Law
The theory that judges should decide cases based on the best
interests of the people, rather than laws, also violates the rule of law
(sometimes called the “Rule of Law”): the principle that the rights
of individuals are to be determined through the impartial
application 73 of “rules previously declared” 74 and not by the
arbitrary will of government officials. 75 This principle, and the
corresponding ideal of a government of laws, provides
“predictability, certainty and stability.” 76 It gives people the
freedom to exercise their rights under the protection of the law.77
And it promotes equality because decisions are not based on the
identity of the parties.
The Rule of Law requires judges to decide based on the legality
of the defendant’s actions at the time of challenged conduct. 78 But
the fiduciary of the people model of judging requires a different
approach. Technical legality or illegality of past conduct is not
controlling. The question, rather, is about the future: whether a
decision for one party or the other would be in the best interests of
those people who matter to the judge79.
The fiduciary model also undermines the idea that judges speak
as and for the law and, therefore, should be accorded the respect that
the law's authority commands. 80 Consider J. Harvie Wilkinson’s
comments about pragmatic judging: “Pragmatic judges are
‘forward-looking’ and ‘future-oriented,’ have a ‘taste for empirical
inquiry,’ and lack any sense of duty to the traditional sources of legal

72. Josh Benson, The Past Does Not Repeat Itself, but It Rhymes: The
Second Coming of the Liberal Anti-Court Movement, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
1071, 1074–75 (2008).
73. See Richard H. Jr. Fallon, ‘The Rule of Law” As a Concept in
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997).
74. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 209 (rev. ed. 1969).
75. See Don Herzog, As Many As Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast,
75 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 626 (1987).
76. Alexander & Solum, supra note 38, at 1629.
77. See William H. Jr. Pryor, Hayek and Textualism, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 893, 914 (2018).
78. See Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 513, 568 (2015).
79. Id. at 568 (discussing how Leib, Serota, and Ponet proposal requires
prospective analysis).
80. See Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 62–63 (1965).
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authority. In a very real sense, these attributes mean pragmatists
aren’t really judges after all . . . .”81
IV. SERVANT OF THE LAW MODEL OF JUDGING
A. Agency and the Oath
If judges are not fiduciaries of the people, what are they? There
are other ways to characterize the role and set a frame from which
norms can be deduced. One way matches up well with how judges
conceive their job. Under this alternative, judges are agents or
servants. Technically, they are government servants; practically and
metaphorically, judges are agents or servants of the law.
To understand why casting judges as agents makes a difference,
definitions are helpful. According to the Restatement (Third) of
Agency: “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one
person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’)
that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the
principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise
consents so to act.”82 A servant (now called an “employee”) is an
agent whose principal (formerly called “master” but now known as
“employer”) has the right to control the physical details of how the
servant carries out the job.83
Thus, agents and servants differ from guardians and trustees in
three crucial ways. First, the creation of the agency relationship
requires the assent of the principal. Second, the agent acts “on
behalf” of the principal: meaning that the agent acts as the principal
(not simply for the benefit of the principal), so that the actions of the
agent within the scope of the agency are deemed to be the actions of
principal.84 Third, the agent is subject to the control of the principal.
The agent must follow the lawful instructions of the principal and
reasonably interpret those instructions so as to further the known
wishes and purposes of the principal.85
Technically, judges are government employees. In a practical
and metaphoric sense, however, judges can be seen as agents or
servants of the law. To assume office, judges must take an oath,
prescribed by law, in which they pledge loyalty and obedience to the
law in much the same way that a servant would pledge loyalty and
81. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 95
(2012).
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW. INST., 2006).
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2 (AM. LAW. INST., 1958).
84. See Daniel Harris, The Lost Rationale of Agency Law, 3 BUS. & FIN. L.
REV. 1 (2019); Fasciana v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 829 A.2d 160, 168–69 (Del. Ch.
2003).
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e, 2.01, 8.09 (AM.
LAW. INST., 2006); Id. § 2.01; Id. § 8.09.
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obedience to a master. Once in office, judges act on behalf of the
law. Their rulings are treated as law and not as their personal
opinions. Furthermore, judges are bound to follow the law in
carrying out their duties.
The language of the oath reinforces the idea that judges are
acting as servants of the law. The federal judicial oath requires a
judge to “solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the
rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform
all the duties incumbent upon me as [Judge or Justice] under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.”86
Of course, treating the law as the judges’ master (even
metaphorically) requires reification of the law. But that is precisely
the point. A key function of agency theory is to enable intangible
legal fictions such as corporations to operate in the real world
through representation by human agents.87 The Rule of Law is an
intangible legal fiction that is vital to our society. For the Rule of
Law to operate, it needs human agents in the same way that a
corporation needs employees. Judges (and others) perform that role.
Interestingly, the Constitution anticipates its need for judges to
act as its human agents. Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution
provides that all “judicial Officers, both of the United States and of
the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support
this Constitution . . . .”88 As Chief Justice John Marshall pointed out
in Marbury v. Madison, “the framers of the constitution
contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts,
as well as of the legislature. Why otherwise does it direct the judges
to take an oath to support it?”89
B. The Ideology of the Judiciary
The idea that judges are agents or servants of the law also has
the support of the current Chief Justice of the United States. At his
confirmation hearing, John Roberts defended the idea of an
impartial judiciary by comparing judges to umpires. In that same
testimony, he also stated: “judges and Justices are servants of the
law, not the other way around.”90 At a ceremony in 2018, the Chief
Justice repeated the idea, saying that “a certain humility should

86. 28 U.S.C. § 453.
87. See Harris, supra note 84.
88. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
89. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 179–80 (1803).
90. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
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characterize the judicial role. Judges and justices are servants of the
law, not the other way around.”91
The word "servant" is an old-fashioned word associated with
old-fashioned virtues such as loyalty, obedience and respect for
authority. The Chief Justice's use of the word is a prime for
traditional morality. It is also the first step in an argument for a
conservative version of the judicial role. The statement that judges
are servants of the law leads naturally to the conclusion that judges
are bound to follow the law in the same way servants are bound to
obey their master. The next phrase "not the other way around"
rejects the progressive idea that judges should use the law to
improve society or otherwise advance their preferred policy agenda.
The bottom line is very similar to something Chief Justice John
Marshall said on behalf of the Supreme Court in 1824: “Courts are
the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing . . . Judicial
power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will
of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of
the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law.”92
The servant model is also better for the Rule of Law. This
approach is consistent with democratic theory because it accords
pride of place to the elected legislature when it comes to changing
the law. Jurisprudence is more stable. Cases are decided (with rare
exceptions) based on the law as it was at the time the parties acted
and not on how the law should be going forward. Judges play a
neutral role, taking the law as given. They do not act as partisans for
some theory of social change or moral progress.
Both parts of the servant-of-the-law model have practical
advantages for the judiciary and its traditional ideology. The word
"servant" (rather than director or guardian) indicates that judges will
play a subordinate role. Courts will not undertake to legislate;
judges will follow the constitutional directives of the legislature and
lower court judges will obey higher courts. The servant model also
evokes the virtue of self-abnegating identification with the master
(i.e. the law), which makes it easier for judges to become their role,
follow authority, and carry out the unpleasant parts of the job, such
as sending people to prison.
Making the law the “master” gives judges a job they know how
to do and saves them from a task that is beyond their expertise. If
judges were required to decide based on the best interests of the
people, they would be at sea. Analyzing legal materials, by contrast,
is their strong suit. And if judges consider policy when resolving
ambiguities in the law, that consideration is incidental to their
primary task of discerning the intent and meaning of the law.
91. Chief Justice John Roberts, About the William H. Rehnquist Award,
54(1) CT. REV. 1, 44 (2018).
92. Osborn v. President, Directors & Co. of Bank, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824).
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Moreover, because they are serving the law, not the general public,
judges can give greater weight in their policy analysis to the interests
of the legal system, such as consistency with precedent93 and ease
of judicial administration.94
Still another advantage of subordinating judges to the law is that
it preserves the independence of the judiciary. If judges were
servants of the government, they could not be impartial when
adjudicating disputes between citizens and the government. If
judges were servants of the people, judges would be pressured to
defer to elected officials who have a direct mandate from the people
and a better sense of what the people want. By contrast, as servants
of the law, judges have home field advantage. They are interpreting
the commands of a master they know better than anyone else. As
Chief Justice John Marshall said on behalf of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Marbury v. Madison in 1803: “It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.”95
The word “servant” sounds humble. But sometimes servants
must display great initiative to figure out what the master means and
how best to carry out the master’s wishes.
C. Academic Opinion
Some scholars support the notion that judges should serve the
law. For instance, a 2015 article by Paul Miller and Andrew Gold
posits that some fiduciaries may be “engaged to determine or
advance certain abstract purposes.”96 As examples, the article cites
charitable trustees97 and judges.98 Also in support is a 2017 book by
Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, which says that “the specific task
with which federal judges are charged is to decide cases by law.”99
Similarly, a 2005 article by Sarah Cravens sees judges as “trustees”
entrusted with the care of the common law and, therefore, obliged
“to uphold and maintain” the corpus of that law “in individual cases
in accordance with the underlying aims of the corpus.”100
Along these same lines, a recent book by Randy Kozel argues
that judges following precedent, rather than their own personal
vision of justice, “is a valuable thing in a system that aspires to
93. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991).
94. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L. J. 909, 994
(2016).
95. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
96. Miller & Gold, supra, note 78, at 517.
97. Id. at 528.
98. Id. at 570.
99. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY 146
(2017).
100. See Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an
Opportunity for Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REEV. 1637, 1639-40 (2005).
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promote the rule of law as opposed to the rule of individual men and
women.”101 “Judges come and go, but the law remains the law.”102
Paul Horwitz also endorses “an office-centered vision of justice”
that requires judges to identify with their office and not remake the
law based on their personal views.103
A similar idea in the field of statutory construction—that judges
should act as faithful agents of the legislature, not as independent
policy makers—has the support of scholars such as John
Manning,104 Jonathan Molot105 and Judge Amy Coney Barrett.106 In
the same vein, a 2010 article by Thomas Merrill points out that if
judges were to interpret statutes based on the best interests of
society, the law would constantly change depending on the policy
views of the most recent decision-maker.” 107 Similarly, a 2017
article by William Baude and Stephen Sachs argues that rules of
interpretation for resolving statutory ambiguities are needed to fill
“gaps that would otherwise be filled by the interpreter’s normative
priors.”108
On the other hand, many scholars reject the idea of judges
following law. 109 In their view, the legalistic approach limits
adaptation to changing circumstances and dooms decision-making
“to mediocrity by mandating the inaccessibility of excellence.”110 A
related criticism is that “[b]ecause the rules that determine existing
legal rights and duties were ... established in the past, ‘legalism …
has a … conservative hue.’”111 Or as a 2019 article by W. Bradley
Wendel on legal advice puts it: “If the only reasons that count … are
those that are part of existing law, then legal discourse itself will

101. RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 6
(2017).
102. Id. at 176.
103. Paul Horwitz, The Constitutional Marriage of Personality and
Impersonality: Office, Honor and the Oath, 33 CONST. COMMENTARY 343, 353
(2018) (reviewing RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF
PRECEDENT (2017)).
104. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 685 (1999).
105. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (2006).
106. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90
B.U. L. REV. 109 (2010).
107. See Merrill, supra note 65, at 1587.
108. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 139
HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1097 (2017).
109. See Jason Iuliano, The Supreme Court’s Noble Lie, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 911, 932-33 (2018).
110. Fredrick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509, 539 (1988).
111. Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95
B.U. L. REV. 209, 255 (2015).
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tend to ratify existing maldistributions of wealth and power in
society.”112
Another critique is that legalism is a fiction that allows judges to
avoid personal responsibility. To quote a 2007 article by J.C.
Olesen: “By treating themselves as humble servants of the law …
judges can indulge in a mythic illusion” and thereby “become blind
to the consequences of their decisions.”113 To similar effect, a 1930
book by Jerome Frank characterizes the idea of judges following law
as “pretense” and “self-delusion” and says judges “must rid
themselves of this reliance on a non-existent guide, they must learn
the virtue, the power and the practical worth of self-authority.”114
D. Judicial Practice
In practice, do judges follow the law or their own sense of
justice? When asked, judges say the law determines the outcome
about ninety percent of the time.115 This includes many cases the
judge would prefer to see come out the other way. To quote U.S.
Court of Appeals Judge Theodore A. McKee: “judges often render
decisions that achieve a result they do not like and enforce laws they
do not agree with. . . . It is not something we like to do, but it is
something that we do routinely regardless of the level of personal
difficulty.”116
Academics tend to focus on the most politically charged cases.
A broader sample indicates that judging (particularly in the lower
federal courts) is not as partisan or free-wheeling as some might
assume. A 2013 study found Republican-appointed U.S. Supreme
Court Justices voted conservatively 57% of the time while
Democratic Supreme Court appointees voted conservatively 40% of
the time, for a partisan difference of 17%. The comparable partisan
gap for the courts of appeal was 4.5%.117 So it appears professional
norms do in fact “produce much more consensus than would be

112. W. Bradley Wendel, The Rule of Law and Legal-Process Reasons in
Attorney Advising, 99 B.U. L. REV. 109, 169 (2019).
113. J.C. Oleson, The Antigone Dilemma: When the Paths of Law and
Morality Diverge, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 669, 689 (2007).
114. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 130-31 (1930).
115. See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A
Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 286
(1997).
116. Theodore A. McKee, Judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709,
1709 (2007).
117. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
RATIONAL CHOICE 168 (2013).
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expected if judges’ decisions mirrored the disagreements in
legislative bodies or political debates.”118
V. CONCLUSION
Neither of the models discussed in this Essay establish
algorithms for judges to follow. Both are metaphors designed to
prime thought and influence behavior. In practice, many judges
operate with both in mind and strive to make decisions consistent
with both. When forced to choose, they answer the easier question:
going with justice if the law is ambiguous or with law if there is no
intuitively just result.
But, in theory, which model should be the norm? What should
judges be told to do in ordinary business litigation when the two
metaphors clearly point in opposite directions and the conflict
between law and justice seems inescapable? While the call of justice
is tempting, telling judges they should act as agents or servants of
the law, and not assume the role of guardians of the people, is more
consistent with the judicial oath, stability, freedom, democracy,
limited government and the rule of law.

118. FRANK EASTERBROOK, FORWARD TO SCALIA & GARNER: READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xxiv (2012).
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